Federal prosecutors have charged Sam Tunick in a GrapheneOS case that turns an anti-coercion phone feature into alleged destruction of property. Tunick, a protester associated with opposition to Atlanta’s law enforcement training center known as Cop City, was stopped by Customs and Border Protection officers at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport on Jan. 24 after returning from the Dominican Republic, according to The Guardian and a defense motion filed in federal court.
The Guardian reported that federal authorities had placed Tunick on a terrorism watchlist because of his alleged ties to the movement against the training center. The project, announced in 2021 and completed in 2025, drew years of opposition, including peaceful demonstrations, confrontations at public meetings and attacks on construction equipment. Georgia previously brought racketeering charges against 61 protesters, a case that stalled last spring, according to the account.
Tunick’s motion to suppress says two CBP officers questioned him without giving Miranda warnings and continued after he said he did not want to speak without a lawyer. The filing says officers told him that because he was refusing to answer questions, they could search his phone, and that customs and immigration searches did not require a warrant.
The motion also says the questioning included references to child sexual abuse images, which the defense characterizes as a pretext to inspect Tunick’s links to the anti-Cop City movement. According to the filing, officers told Tunick they would either search the phone with his cooperation or seize it.
What is a GrapheneOS duress PIN?
GrapheneOS is a security-focused mobile operating system. Its duress PIN or password feature lets a user set a separate credential that, when entered at a device credential prompt, irreversibly wipes the phone and installed eSIMs, according to GrapheneOS documentation cited in the case discussion.
The feature is designed for coercive situations: the user appears to provide a credential, but the device erases itself instead of unlocking. GrapheneOS says the wipe does not require a reboot and cannot be stopped once triggered.
According to Tunick’s motion, Agent Findley and other officers repeatedly asked him to unlock the phone and said they would take it if he did not. When Tunick eventually gave a passcode, the phone’s screen went dark, flashed several times and appeared to restart, the filing says. That sequence is consistent with the duress mode described by GrapheneOS.
The federal case does not charge Tunick with obstruction or destruction of evidence, according to the account. Prosecutors instead rely on a statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2232, that criminalizes destroying or removing property to prevent a federal seizure. The property at issue is the phone the officers wanted to search.
Why does the Sam Tunick GrapheneOS case matter?
The case tests how far prosecutors can go when a person gives officers a credential that triggers a built-in security function rather than access. The defense argument, as presented in the motion, is that officers compelled the passcode demand after Tunick asked for a lawyer and then treated the result of that demand as a new crime.
Cybersecurity and surveillance expert Christophe Boutry told The Guardian the case sends a worrying message that GrapheneOS could be treated as criminal by default. Boutry and Bill Buddington, a senior staff technologist at the Electronic Frontier Foundation, said they had not seen a similar case, according to The Guardian.
The court’s handling of Tunick’s suppression motion will decide what evidence prosecutors may use. It will also signal whether a privacy feature built to resist coercion can become part of the government’s theory of criminal intent when border officers demand access to a phone.
This story draws on original reporting from Techdirt.
