The Telegraph reported that camera components on Royal Navy K3 Scout uncrewed vessels sent device-status communications to an IP address in China, prompting the Ministry of Defence to remove the cameras’ internet connectivity. The ministry says its investigation found no evidence that MoD data or systems were accessed, compromised or transmitted externally.
The distinction is doing a lot of work. The published reporting describes an outbound connection, while the MoD’s quoted finding does not establish that sensitive military information left the system, or that a Chinese state body operated the destination address.
What did Royal Navy drones send to China?
According to The Telegraph, the cameras sent “heartbeat communications,” automated messages used to tell a remote system that a device is online and operating. Tom’s Hardware also reported that the MoD characterized the transmissions that way. Neither account identifies the precise fields in those messages, and the material available does not include a technical assessment or forensic report.
The MoD said a routine cyber-vulnerability assessment found an issue affecting a Kraken Unmanned Surface Vessel subsystem used by the Royal Navy. In the statement quoted by The Telegraph, the department said its testing and assurance processes are intended to find and address potential vulnerabilities early. It did not say the vessels had been withdrawn, that the cameras had been replaced, or that a fleet-wide review had been ordered.
The Telegraph reported that the K3 Scout fleet was supplied by Kraken Technology Group, which obtained the cameras from a third party that had provided security assurances. The newspaper reported that the camera components were made in China. Kraken’s response, if any, is not included in the available reporting.
The Royal Marines have used the reported £12 million K3 Scout fleet since March, according to The Telegraph and Tom’s Hardware. The newspaper also reported concerns that the vessels had been near sensitive Special Boat Service activity and that cameras could remain active when the vessels were switched off. Those are reported concerns, not findings that meetings, imagery or other sensitive material were captured or transmitted.
What did the MoD do after finding the issue?
The department cut the cameras’ internet access, according to The Telegraph, Tom’s Hardware and Firstpost. That stops the reported external connection from the affected camera setup. It does not, by itself, answer how the connection was configured, who controlled the endpoint, or what exact status information, if any, had been sent before the change.
The evidence on hand is narrow: press coverage quotes an MoD statement, but no ministry release, network logs, independent technical review or public forensic analysis is available here. The reported China-bound heartbeat traffic and the MoD’s no-evidence-of-compromise finding can both be true. They are not interchangeable claims.
This story draws on original reporting from Tom's Hardware.
